Skills Distribution, Migration and Wage Differences in Pure Service-Exchange Economy by Gupta, Abhay
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Skills Distribution, Migration and Wage
Differences in Pure Service-Exchange
Economy
Abhay Gupta
University of British Columbia
June 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/9000/
MPRA Paper No. 9000, posted 7. June 2008 11:05 UTC
Skills Distribution, Migration and Wage
Diﬀerences in Pure Service-Exchange Economy
Abhay Gupta
abhayg@interchange.ubc.ca
September 30, 2007
1
Abstract
This paper considers an economy with skilled agents exchanging
their services. Using Cobb-Douglas preferences, the paper shows that
there exists an optimal (average welfare maximizing) skills’ distribu-
tion. This optimal distribution is independent of productivity and is
welfare equalizing.
If the skill-distribution is not optimal, then some agents are better-
oﬀ than others. In such a scenario, migration in some sectors is
average-welfare improving while inviting skilled-agents in others re-
duces average welfare.
”Productivity increase of worse-oﬀ sector” without changing the
overall skills’ composition of economy increases the wage gap.
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1 Introduction
In services context, most of the marginal production takes place using labor
only. Once infrastructure is set up, it can be used for services’ production
using the required skills (subject to technological limit). The input to the
production process are time and labor-skill. Hence for each time period the
production only depend on the stock of skills in the economy. If we treat
these skills as agents’ endowments, then the economy can be represented by
an exchange economy. This makes the model easier to solve and the results
easier to interpret.
This kind of argument is more valid when it comes to Consulting Ser-
vices, where a person’s knowledge and skills are the most important (and
often the only) inputs to the production process.
Some of the relevant questions are: why some skills (like Doctor and
Lawyer) are valued more; is there an optimal skills’ distribution; if govern-
ment can control this distribution (by training and/or immigration), how
should it make the decision; are there good and bad (not-so-good) skills/
sectors?
In most major economies fraction of Service sector in GDP is growing
everywhere. Speciﬁc Skills are required for production of services (unlike
capital which is mostly homogeneous). Usually, individual agents decide
which skills to acquire, government has no control over it. But skills’ compo-
sition is crucial for economy, government should take an aggressive approach
to determine which skills its agents acquire (by investing/ providing subsidies
etc.)
Technology (production and consumption) is of immense important in
service sector. A better understanding of government technological policy in
terms of Formalizing and Implications has huge potential.
Having optimal skills’ composition translates into comparative advantage
in today’s Global-Service-Economy. But not much has been done to formal-
ize the government technology policy as in: Which skills to promote? (via
immigration or training) Which sectors/ technologies to promote and How?
This paper emphasizes the importance of skills’ composition of economy,
distributional aspects due to diﬀerence in skills of agents and presence of
technological-externalities within a sector.
2 Basic Model Setup
Consider an economy with N agents skilled to perform various services. They
get utility from consuming these services.
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• Service production requires only the labor in form of agent’s skill (and
time). The infrastructure capital required to perform these services is
already available.)
• There is a market for services exchange where agents trade in services
with each-other. (Government provides coupons that help solve credi-
bility problems).
• There are N services and each requires a unique skills to produce it.1
• Utility: u(S). Deﬁned over N services.
• Skills’ Endowment Matrix: Ω.
It is an NxN matrix of 0s and 1s and maps agents to the skills, indicating
whether an agent has a particular skill or not.
• Productivity Matrix: AΩ
It is a NxN matrix and maps skills to services indicating how much of
service (no. of transactions) can a particular skill can produce. It is a
DIAGONAL matrix based on our setup. 2 3
– Here it is assumed that one skill can produce more than one ser-
vices. Alternatively, it can be assumed that one service requires
more than one skills to produce it (Requirement matrix).
• Total Production: Y = [1, 1, ...1] ∗ Ω ∗ AΩ
• Income vector: I = Ω∗AΩ∗P T , where P is the price vector [p1, p2, ...., pN ].
The model has a nice feature that skills’ distribution over the agents in
the economy determines the supply of each service and thus the price of that
service (Because production requires only labor/ skills). Another fea-
ture is that their income also depend on the price vector, which depends on
skills’ distribution and preferences.
Assumptions
1This is just a simpliﬁcation. In general, one service may require more than one skills
and similarly one skills can produce more than one services.
2Using this setup instead of having a direct NxN Agent-productivity matrix is more
logical. Since productivity of a particular agent may be hidden information, while his
skills are known by the certiﬁcations he holds and each skill-certiﬁcation standard will
have information about the service production.
3Another advantage is that Government can control these two parameters by asking the
agents to take these professional-certiﬁcations (control Ω) and by changing the standard
of these certiﬁcations(manage AΩ). Similarly, productivity shocks aﬀect the whole
industry rather than a particular person.
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1. ui(si1, s
i
2, ....s
i
N) =
∏
j (s
i
j)
αj
2. Ωi = [0, 0, ....1, 0, ...0].
Each agent has only one of the skills.
Solution:
Using optimal service demand result for Cobb-Douglas functional form,
total demand for service i:
Σj(
αi∗Ij
pi
) = αi
pi
∗ Σj(ajj ∗ pj).
Total production of service i is ai. Hence the market clearing price is
given by -
pi =
αi∗Σj(ajj∗pj)
ai
⇒ pi
pk
= αi/ai
αk/ak
Price of a service is proportional to the ratio of preference pa-
rameter of that sector divided by the productivity of that sector.
The utility level of ith agent is:
ui(S) = Πj((
αj∗Ii
pj
)αj) = Ii
Σk(akk∗pk) ∗ Πj(aj)αj
⇒ ui
uk
= Ii
Ik
= ai∗pi
ak∗pk =
αj
αk
Utility ratio of agents is equal to the ratio of importance of their
skills (i.e. of the services their skills produce).
For example, doctors will be better oﬀ than workers if medical services
has a higher α in the preferences.
This ratio does not depend on productivities of the sector.
Hence if their is a productivity shock in one of the sector, gains are shared
by all the agents (sectors) in the ratio of their skills’ importance.
3 Optimal number of skilled agents
For a consumer some services are more important than other. Hence it is
better for an (closed) economy to produce more of the important service.
Given consumer’s preference the optimal ratio of services’ production (and
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thus the skills/ labor required to produce that amount) can be determined.
This will help policy-makers in deciding which skills government should
promote via immigration policy or tax/ other incentives.
Extending the above model for the case of 2 services, medical services
(D) and construction services (W) which require Doctor’s and construction
Worker’s skills.
• There are d Doctors and w Workers.
• Each type of agent needs some training (or certiﬁcation exam) before
he can provide the service. It can be thought of as cost of acquiring
skills.
• Their productivity is given by, A = 1− tD 0
0 1− tW .
This can be explained by assuming that tD and tW is the cost (the
time required out of total endowment of 1 unit) for doctors and workers
to get training/ certiﬁcation in their profession. Hence they can now
perform (1− tD) and (1− tW ) transactions respectively.
• New agents can join the economy (i.e. government can invite immi-
grants from abroad or promote education so that previously unskilled
people can take part certiﬁcation exchange).
Market clearing condition for D becomes:
d ∗ (αD∗pD∗(1−tD)
pD
) + w ∗ (αd∗pW (1−tW )
pD
) = d ∗ (1− tD)
⇒ pW
pD
= d∗αW ∗(1−tD)
w∗αD∗(1−tW )
The price becomes, pD =
w∗αD∗(1−tW )
(w∗αD∗(1−tW ))+(d∗αW ∗(1−tD))
Utility is given by, [uD = (
w
d
)αW ∗ αD ∗ (1− tD)αD ∗ (1− tW )αW ]
and [uW = (
d
w
)αD ∗ αW ∗ (1− tD)αD ∗ (1− tW )αW ]
The usual supply-demand comparative statistics holds.
• As d ↑, pD ↓ and as w ↑, pD ↑ . More doctors make price of medical
services cheaper, while more workers make it costlier.
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• As d ↑, uD ↓, but uW ↑. More doctors make existing doctors
worse oﬀ while existing workers become better oﬀ.
• As w ↑, uW ↓, but uD ↑. More workers make existing workers
worse oﬀ while existing doctors become better oﬀ.
• As tD ↓ or tW ↓, uD ↑ and uW ↑. Productivity gains in any sector
or Reducing (any of) the training costs makes all consumers
better oﬀ.
3.1 Total Welfare
Since increase in d aﬀects the welfare of Doctors and Workers in opposite
way, it will be interesting to see what happens to the total welfare when a
new doctor joins the economy (is born or immigrates).
Deﬁne total welfare, U = w ∗ uW + d ∗ uD
∂U
∂d
= αD ∗ (wd )αW ∗ (1− tD)αD ∗ (1− tW )αW
and ∂U
∂w
= αW ∗ ( dw )αD ∗ (1− tD)αD ∗ (1− tW )αW
• Both ∂U
∂d
and ∂U
∂w
are positive. Hence total welfare goes up if a new
agent enters the economy irrespective of its skill endowment.
• To decide which skills should government promote (i.e. via immigration
policy or investment in education etc.), one can compare the increase
in total beneﬁt by each skilled worker.
– Doctors are more beneﬁcial to the economy compared to the con-
struction workers if ∂U
∂d
> ∂U
∂w
.
– Prefer doctor if d
w
< αD
αW
– Prefer worker if d
w
> αD
αW
– If ( d
w
)∗ = αD
αW
, total welfare increase does not depend on
the skill of agent joining the economy (by birth, training or
immigration).
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3.2 Average Welfare
When a new agent joins the economy, the total endowment of the economy
increases (and as a result total welfare). Therefore total welfare may not be
the correct deciding factor for the government. Decision makers may want
to see the eﬀect of new skilled immigrant on average welfare.
Average welfare, U = w
αW ∗dαD∗(1−tD)αD∗(1−tW )αW
w+d
⇒ ∂U
∂d
= (1−tD)
αD∗(1−tW )αW ∗[w1+αW ∗αD∗d−αW −αW ∗wαW ∗dαD ]
(w+d)2
∂U
∂d
> 0 will require αD
αW
> d
w
.
• A new doctor increases the average welfare if d
w
< αD
αW
and
decreases the average welfare otherwise.
• A new construction worker increases the average welfare if
d
w
> αD
αW
and decreases the average welfare otherwise.
• If ( d
w
)∗ = αD
αW
, then average welfare does not increase by change
in the number of skilled agents( ∂U
∂d
= ∂U
∂w
= 0 ).
Social Planner’s Optimal Skills Allocation:
If there is a social planner faced with problem of allocating the stock of
total population N to one of the two sectors (Medical Services, D and Con-
struction Services, W) to maximize the average welfare, the optimal solution
would be -
maxd[
(N−d)αW ∗dαD∗(1−tD)αD∗(1−tW )αW
N
]
This gives ( d
w
)∗Social−Planner =
αD
αW
, which is same as above optimal ratio.
3.3 Steady-State and Planned Expansion
If economy has skills distributed in this optimal ratio, expanding the econ-
omy (i.e. adding a new agent) will not change the average welfare. But if
government decides to expand the economy (increase the size), then it should
plan the expansion in a way such that this optimal ratio is maintained. This
way expansion will not reduce the average welfare.
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Optimal ratio is welfare-equalizing:
1. At this ideal d
w
ratio, the price of doctor’s service becomes:
p∗D =
(1−tW )
(1−tW )+(1−tD) .
⇒ p∗D
p∗W
= (1−tW )
(1−tD) ⇒ Incomeworker = Incomedoctor
2. If economy has skilled agents in this ratio (ratio of αs in the
preferences), then both kind of agents (doctors and construc-
tion workers) are equally well oﬀ. (i.e. uD(
d
w
)∗ = uW ( dw )
∗)
3. At optimal skills’ ratio, the relative price of a service is inverse
of the ratio of respective sectors’ productivities.
Figure 1 shows various expansion paths for an economy. It has 100 agents
(in ratio 1:1, while the optimal is 3:2) to start with and wants to double its
size. As shown in the ﬁgure, unplanned expansion (increasing only doctors
or only workers) in fact reduces the average welfare.
Also notice that doctors end up at a lower utility level in the optimal
expansion case. This highlights the presence of lobbying or resistance to
expand from a particular sector. Currently well-oﬀ sector stands to lose from
moving toward the optimal distribution.
3.4 Investment in Training Facilities
Even though the cost of acquiring the skills (certiﬁcation or training) is wel-
fare reducing, it is beneﬁcial to compare the costs in diﬀerent sectors. In
particular, when is the case that:
∂U
∂tD
< ∂U
∂tW
⇒ (1−tD)
(1−tW ) <
αD
αW
• In making investment decision for the skills training sector, so that
to reduce the cost of training or certiﬁcation, government should
use the above relation to ﬁnd out which cost aﬀects average
welfare more severely.
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Figure 1: Expansion Path for Cobb-Douglas
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3.5 Productivity Shock
Now we study the eﬀect of productivity shock on optimal skills’ distribution.
We can introduce the productivity shock in one of the two ways.
1. Productivity of each agent increases to 2 i.e. now each doctor can
produce 2 ∗ (1− tD) medical services each period.
2. Cost goes down (Agent can complete his training in less time) i.e. now
each doctor can produce (1− tD
2
) medical services each period).
Solving for optimal skills’ ratio gives the same result, i.e. ( d
w
)∗ = αD
αW
.
The intuition behind this result is that increased productivity leads to in-
creased doctors’ income, which in turn increases the demand for construction
services. This changes the prices (i.e. PD
PW
↓). Optimal distribution of skills
remain unchanged.
Also:
• A positive productivity shock in ANY sector increases the average
welfare and individual utility for each type of agent (for any skill-
distribution).
• The increase is EQUAL only if the skills’ ratio is optimal.
4 Creative Destruction
• As economy develops, new services are invented and people start con-
suming these services. As a result, the share of income spent on old
services goes down.
• Skilled labor should also be added (or new immigrants are brought in)
to new services sector, so that this kind of optimal ratio is maintained.
• If new labor can not be added, then only way to achieve the optimal
ratio is to move existing labor from one of the sector (whose income
share has gone down) to this new sector.
• This seems to be a similar concept like creative destruction.
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4.1 Eﬀect of New Service Invention
Extending the 2 services model, now suppose that a new service Internet
(denoted by I) is invented. After a while consumer form preferences over all
three of the services.
For ease in calculation, also assume that tD = tW = tI = 0.
Market clearing condition for medical services -
d ∗ αD + w ∗ αD ∗ pWpD + i ∗ αD ∗
pI
pD
= d ⇒ d ∗ (1−αD)
αD
= w ∗ pW
pD
+ i ∗ pI
pD
Solving this with similar conditions for other two markets gives -
pD
pI
=
i ∗ αD
d ∗ αI (1a)
pW
pI
=
i ∗ αW
w ∗ αI (1b)
pD
pW
=
w ∗ αD
d ∗ αW (1c)
The utility level of a doctor becomes -
u(d) = αD ∗ (wd )αW ∗ ( id)αI
Average utility is given by -
U = d
αD∗wαW ∗iαI
w+d+i
∂U
∂d
≥ 0 ⇒ w+i
d
≥ αW +αI
αD
∂U
∂w
≥ 0 ⇒ d+i
w
≥ αD+αI
αW
∂U
∂i
≥ 0 ⇒ d+w
i
≥ αD+αW
αI
Proposition 1: There exists an optimal ratio of (d:w:i). 4
Proof:
∂U
∂i
= 0; ∂U
∂w
= 0 ⇒ d = w∗αD
αW
4Optimal in the sense that at this ratio the average utility is at its maximum.
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Similarly solving other sets of equation gives optimal ratio (d : w : i) =
(αD : αW : αi).
Proposition 2: All three of ∂U
∂d
, ∂U
∂i
, ∂U
∂w
can not be all positive.
Proof:
Assume ∂U
∂d
> 0; ∂U
∂w
> 0. These two imply:
w+i
d
> 1−αD
αD
; i+d
w
> 1−αW
αW
Adding these two inequalities gives:
(1−αi
αi
> w+d
i
⇒ ∂U
∂i
< 0
Proposition 3: If skills’ distribution is not at optimal level, some of the
sectors will be better oﬀ than others (in terms of agents’ welfare).
Proof:
From equations 1, it is evident if (d : w : i) = (αD : αW : αI) then prices
will be diﬀerent. Hence agent’s income (or welfare) in each sector will be
diﬀerent.
4.2 Feasibility and Rush for First-Mover’s Advantage
If government ensures that after such a change in taste, it will bring in the
scarce skills (either through immigration or through training of new agents)
then there will not be any of the so called destruction. Sectors which have
their income share go down will not be worse oﬀ, since at optimal allocation
the utility is equal across all the sectors.
However this kind of policy may not be always feasible, due to immi-
gration laws of country or due to lack of unskilled new labor which can be
trained in the new sector. If that is the case agents in worse-oﬀ sector may
decide to acquire the new skills themselves (supposing that they can do it
without any cost). They have an incentive to do it sooner rather than later
because the longer they wait the smaller the welfare gain gets (since other
agents will be joining the new sector and the ratio moving more towards
optimal ratio).
4.3 Simulation
Even though when it is not possible for government to get the new agents,
it should control the training and movement of the labor to the new sector
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so that new optimal ratio can be reached.
If agents are allowed to decide it themselves it may take a lot more time
to reach optimal and some the skill distribution may never achieve the steady
state.
The situation is simulated as follows.
Consumers have preferences such that (d : w : i)∗ = (3 : 1 : 1). At
the beginning, economy has 100 agents with 60 doctors, 35 workers and 5
Internet experts. If there is a government policy in place which strives for
optimal skills’ distribution, it will train 15 workers in Internet skills and move
them to sector I. If we assume that each period only 5 people can be trained
(say due to infrastructure limitation), then economy will reach optimal ratio
in 3 periods.
Consider instead that 5 agents (who work in a non-highest-price sector)
then they are trained in a sector with higher price than their current sector.
If there are two such sectors, one is chosen at random. For example, at
beginning of the period doctors will want to move to Internet sector, while
workers may want to move to either Medical or Internet services sector.
As ﬁgures 2 and 3 show, if there is no policy in place the steady state
may never occur and economy will experience a lot of ﬂuctuations with agents
moving from one-sector to other.
4.4 Growth Options
Above discussion shows that:
• If economy is already at an optimal skills-distribution, average welfare
can not be increased by expanding one of the sector. In this case,
productivity improvements will increase the average welfare (and indi-
vidual welfare as well for all sectors).
• If economy is at the sub-optimal level, expanding all sectors of the
economy is not going to be optimal. There will be at-least one sector
expansion of which is going to decrease the average welfare.
• If a sub-optimal economy is not able to introduce new agents, some
sector diminishes and other sector grows to increase the average welfare.
5 Wage Gap
Optimal ratio is welfare equalizing is a really neat result. The prevalent
situation that workers are worse oﬀ than doctors (possibly because their
14
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services are not valued much in the preferences) arises due to the non-optimal
skills distribution.
From ﬁgure 1 it is clear that more well-oﬀ group has an incentive to lobby
against the optimal distribution. Furthermore, better-oﬀ group gains more
from increase in other sector’s productivity. Hence following a “productivity
increase of worse-oﬀ sector” approach only increases the welfare gap, as shown
in the ﬁgure 5
6 Further Extensions
• Enriching existing person’s skill set Ω rather than increasing the size
of the economy will be a better way for the growth in average welfare.
• Finding which skills are more valuable (by preference structure and
productivity) and skewing Ω to move up in the value chain in the
global economy (OPEN economy extension of the model).
• Diversiﬁcation (to insure against productivity shocks and taste-changes)
vs. Specialization (patenting a particular high-value sector technology
with WTO with lots of Enhancing complements).
• Use alternative setup for production technology (Requirement matrix
rather than Productivity matrix).
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